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1 Fixed Mechanization Process Control System
General subject: FMPCS (Scio Systems' hardware/ software system that controls USPS sack, parcel, and large parcel sorting machines, timeshare conveyor systems, container routing ( towline) systems, and specialized induction s)Универсальный русско-английский словарь > Fixed Mechanization Process Control System
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2 производственное оборудование
1) General subject: capital equipment2) Engineering: fabrication facilities, factory environment, industrial equipment, manufacturing facilities, materials, plant engineering, production environment, production equipment, production facilities, production tooling3) Construction: machinery4) Economy: business equipment (промышленное, транспортное, сельскохозяйственное, торговое, конторское), equipment facilities, manufacturing equipment, mechanical facilities5) Accounting: business equipment (промышленное, транспортное, сельскохозяйственное, торгово-конторское)6) Telecommunications: product engineering7) Information technology: plant8) Business: machinery and plant, operating equipment, operating machinery, operating plant, production apparatus, production machinery9) Production: production facility10) Industrial economy: mechanical production11) Microelectronics: industrial facilities12) Automation: operating environment, process machines13) Makarov: fabrication facility14) SAP.fin. plant and equipment15) Logistics: industrial propertyУниверсальный русско-английский словарь > производственное оборудование
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3 производственное оборудование
production equipment, manufacturing facilities, production facilities, process machinesРусско-английский исловарь по машиностроению и автоматизации производства > производственное оборудование
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4 Artificial Intelligence
In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, EventuallyJust as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the ProgramMany problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)[AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract FormThe basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory FormationIt is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular ContextsEven if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial IntelligenceThe primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary PropositionsIn artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence
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5 Winding
The operation of transferring yarn from one form of package to another, such as winding from hanks to bobbins, from bobbins to cones, from cops to bobbins, etc. The process that follows spinning determines whether winding is necessary or not. Cops and ring tubes or bobbins can be used in that form as weft in the shuttle, but they are not suitable for making into warps, nor as supply to knitting or braiding machines. Yarn in the other forms of spun packages requires to be pirned for use as weft. Although yarn winding is not a fundamental process like spinning and weaving, it occupies a very important place in the economics of yarn processing, and probably embraces a wider range of different machines than any other phase of textile processing. Even a bare catalogue of the different kinds of winding machines would far too lengthy for inclusion here. Broadly, winding machines are adapted for: - 1. Winding yarn for use as weft in loom shuttles, including winding on to wood pirns and paper tubes; solid cops for use in shuttles without tongues; quills for use in ribbon and smallware looms; layer locking at the nose of the pirn to prevent sloughing of rayon weft; bunch building at the base of pirns for use in automatic looms; weft rewound from spinner's cops into larger packages to give maximum length at one filling of the shuttle. The yarn supply can be from hanks, cops, spinner's bobbins, cones, cheeses, warps, etc. 2. Winding yarns for making warps from spinner's cops or bobbins, hanks that have been sized, bleached or dyed, cones, cheeses, and other forms of supply. 3. Winding yarns into suitable form for sizing, bleaching, dyeing, or for receiving other wet treatments, including hanks, warps, cheeses, cops, etc. 4. Winding yarns for knitting, i.e., on to splicer bobbins, cones, pineapple cones, bottle bobbins, etc., and on to bobbins for use in braiding machines. 5. Special process winding such as the precision winding of several threads side by side in tape form for covering wire, etc. 6. Winding yarns into packages for retail selling such as winding mending wools on cards; sewing thread on wood spools or small flangeless cheeses; crochet embroidery and other threads into balls; packing string info balls and cheeses; harvesting twine into large balls and cones, etc. -
6 Bibliography
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
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7 Verfahren
Verfahren n 1. COMP procedure (Programm); 2. GEN process, procedure; 3. IND process, technique; 4. MGT method; 5. RECHT procedure proceedings, action, suit (Rechtsstreit); 6. ADMIN procedure • ein Verfahren für ungültig erklären RECHT extinguish an action • gegen jmdn. ein Verfahren anstrengen RECHT bring a lawsuit against sb* * *n 1. < Comp> Programm procedure; 2. < Geschäft> process, procedure; 3. < Ind> process, technique; 4. < Mgmnt> method; 5. < Recht> procedure Rechtsstreit proceedings, action, suit; 6. < Verwalt> procedure ■ ein Verfahren für ungültig erklären < Recht> extinguish an action ■ gegen jmdn. ein Verfahren anstrengen < Recht> bring a lawsuit against sb* * *Verfahren
(Arbeitsvorgang) operation, course, (Behandlung) treatment, (Gericht) procedure, proceeding[s], process, case, suit at law (US), lawsuit (US), (Handlungsweise) deal (coll.), dealings, (Herstellung) process, method, technique, departure, (Methode) manner, method, plan, line, way, mode, (Schema) policy, system;
• in einem schwebenden Verfahren pendente lite (lat.);
• abgekürztes Verfahren summary proceeding;
• aufeinander abgestimmtes Verfahren concerted practices;
• abgetrenntes Verfahren separate trial;
• anhängiges Verfahren case at law, proceedings instituted;
• beschleunigtes Verfahren speedup;
• bildgebendes Verfahren imaging technique;
• disziplinarisches Verfahren disciplinary proceedings;
• einheitliches Verfahren standard practice, uniform procedure;
• Einsparungen ermöglichendes Verfahren saver;
• gerichtliches Verfahren legal proceedings, judicial process (proceedings);
• getrenntes Verfahren separate action;
• industrielles Verfahren know-how, industrial technique;
• konkursrechtliches Verfahren bankruptcy proceedings (procedure);
• kostspieliges Verfahren costly proceedings, wasteful process;
• neuartiges Verfahren novel method;
• neues Verfahren new departure;
• ordentliches Verfahren regular process, ordinary proceedings;
• ordnungsgemäßes Verfahren due process of law;
• patentfähiges Verfahren patentable process;
• patentiertes Verfahren patented process;
• schiedsgerichtliches Verfahren arbitration procedure;
• schriftliches Verfahren written proceedings;
• übliches steuernsparendes Verfahren tax-saving pattern;
• überholtes Verfahren outmoded process;
• [allgemein] übliches Verfahren common practice;
• ungerechtes Verfahren unfair hearing;
• ungesetzliches Verfahren illegal proceedings;
• ungültiges Verfahren void (irregular) process, mistrial;
• unvorschriftsmäßiges Verfahren undue proceedings;
• verbessertes Verfahren improved process;
• Verfahren bei der Aufstellung des Haushalts budget procedure;
• Verfahren bei der Aufstellung des Werbeetats (Werbebudgets) advertising-budget procedure;
• Verfahren zur besseren Ausnutzung elektronischer Datenverarbeitungsanlagen time-sharing of data-processing machines;
• Verfahren zur Beilegung von Tarifstreitigkeiten disputes procedure;
• Verfahren zur Festsetzung der Folgeprämie renewal procedure;
• Verfahren zur Festsetzung eines Prioritätsrechtes (Patentrecht) interference proceedings;
• Verfahren zur Feststellung der Schadenhöhe writ of inquiry [after judgment by default];
• Verfahren zur Freigabe von Geheimmaterial declassification procedure;
• Verfahren der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit non-contentious business;
• Verfahren zur Gründung einer Kapitalgesellschaft incorporation procedure (US);
• Verfahren im Interesse einer Klägergruppe class action (suit);
• Verfahren in Nachlassangelegenheiten administration suit;
• Verfahren zur Offenlegung der Vermögensverhältnisse equitable garnishment, supplementary proceedings (US);
• Verfahren eines integrierten Planungs-, Programmierungs- und Haushaltssystems Planning-Programming-Budgeting System;
• Verfahren zur Regelung arbeitsrechtlicher Streitigkeiten disputes procedure;
• Verfahren zur Regelung von Versicherungsansprüchen claim procedure;
• Verfahren in der Revisionsinstanz proceedings in error;
• Verfahren in Steuersachen process in tax proceedings;
• Verfahren in Warenzeichenangelegenheiten trademark procedure;
• Verfahren abtrennen to separate a case;
• Verfahren anstrengen to institute legal proceedings, to bring a suit;
• neues Verfahren anwenden to take a new departure;
• sein übliches Verfahren anwenden to follow one’s standard practice;
• Verfahren wieder aufnehmen to reopen a case;
• neue Verfahren ausprobieren to experiment with new methods;
• gerichtliches Verfahren aussetzen to stay (suspend) the proceedings, to arrest judgment;
• Verfahren beschleunigen to accelerate proceedings, to speed up procedures;
• Verfahren gegen j. in Gang bringen to take out a process against s. o.;
• Verfahren durchführen to proceed with a case, to carry on legal proceedings;
• neue technologische Verfahren in der Industrie einführen to make technical innovations in industry;
• in ein laufendes Verfahren eingreifen to publish comment on cases pending;
• Verfahren wegen Amtsmissbrauchs einleiten to take misfeasance proceedings;
• Verfahren einstellen to abate proceedings, to dismiss a case;
• einheitliches Verfahren erarbeiten to standardize procedure;
• ordnungsgemäßes Verfahren sicherstellen to regularize the proceedings;
• sich einem schiedsrichterlichen Verfahren unterwerfen to submit a claim for arbitration;
• Verfahren verschleppen to delay the proceedings;
• in einem schiedsgerichtlichen Verfahren tätig werden to arbitrate between parties to a suit;
• zu den Kosten des Verfahrens verurteilt werden to be condemned in (ordered to pay) the costs. -
8 Language
Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)[A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling itSolving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into anotherLANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own LanguageThe forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)[It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human InteractionLanguage cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Language
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9 технология
1) General subject: art, know-how, technology, technics, technical process (whether now known or hereafter devised), (применяемая к данным) manipulation techniques (applied to data) (при обработке данных для получения конечного продукта)2) Medicine: technic3) Military: development sequence, process sequence, sequence of operations, technique4) Engineering: approach, engineering, method, practice, procedure (технического обслуживания), process, process engineering, processing, set-up5) Construction: manufacturing process6) Railway term: production sequence7) Forestry: method of procedure (напр. обработки)8) Polygraphy: workflow9) Abbreviation: tech10) Electronics: photoresist technology11) Mechanics: production technique12) Coolers: technique13) Patents: techniques14) Drilling: hang15) Sakhalin energy glossary: proven16) Oilfield: operating procedure, operational procedure, practices17) Microelectronics: processing technique18) Network technologies: synchronous data compression19) Automation: manning, production method20) Quality control: process engineering (производства)21) Makarov: fabrication route, know-how (совокупность методов обработки, изготовления), practice (метод, способ), process (метод, способ), process of production, production process, technology (метод, способ)22) Cement: machines -
10 Lister, Samuel Cunliffe, 1st Baron Masham
SUBJECT AREA: Textiles[br]b. 1 January 1815 Calverly Hall, Bradford, Englandd. 2 February 1906 Swinton Park, near Bradford, England[br]English inventor of successful wool-combing and waste-silk spinning machines.[br]Lister was descended from one of the old Yorkshire families, the Cunliffe Listers of Manningham, and was the fourth son of his father Ellis. After attending a school on Clapham Common, Lister would not go to university; his family hoped he would enter the Church, but instead he started work with the Liverpool merchants Sands, Turner \& Co., who frequently sent him to America. In 1837 his father built for him and his brother a worsted mill at Manningham, where Samuel invented a swivel shuttle and a machine for making fringes on shawls. It was here that he first became aware of the unhealthy occupation of combing wool by hand. Four years later, after seeing the machine that G.E. Donisthorpe was trying to work out, he turned his attention to mechanizing wool-combing. Lister took Donisthorpe into partnership after paying him £12,000 for his patent, and developed the Lister-Cartwright "square nip" comber. Until this time, combing machines were little different from Cartwright's original, but Lister was able to improve on this with continuous operation and by 1843 was combing the first fine botany wool that had ever been combed by machinery. In the following year he received an order for fifty machines to comb all qualities of wool. Further combing patents were taken out with Donisthorpe in 1849, 1850, 1851 and 1852, the last two being in Lister's name only. One of the important features of these patents was the provision of a gripping device or "nip" which held the wool fibres at one end while the rest of the tuft was being combed. Lister was soon running nine combing mills. In the 1850s Lister had become involved in disputes with others who held combing patents, such as his associate Isaac Holden and the Frenchman Josué Heilmann. Lister bought up the Heilmann machine patents and afterwards other types until he obtained a complete monopoly of combing machines before the patents expired. His invention stimulated demand for wool by cheapening the product and gave a vital boost to the Australian wool trade. By 1856 he was at the head of a wool-combing business such as had never been seen before, with mills at Manningham, Bradford, Halifax, Keighley and other places in the West Riding, as well as abroad.His inventive genius also extended to other fields. In 1848 he patented automatic compressed air brakes for railways, and in 1853 alone he took out twelve patents for various textile machines. He then tried to spin waste silk and made a second commercial career, turning what was called "chassum" and hitherto regarded as refuse into beautiful velvets, silks, plush and other fine materials. Waste silk consisted of cocoon remnants from the reeling process, damaged cocoons and fibres rejected from other processes. There was also wild silk obtained from uncultivated worms. This is what Lister saw in a London warehouse as a mass of knotty, dirty, impure stuff, full of bits of stick and dead mulberry leaves, which he bought for a halfpenny a pound. He spent ten years trying to solve the problems, but after a loss of £250,000 and desertion by his partner his machine caught on in 1865 and brought Lister another fortune. Having failed to comb this waste silk, Lister turned his attention to the idea of "dressing" it and separating the qualities automatically. He patented a machine in 1877 that gave a graduated combing. To weave his new silk, he imported from Spain to Bradford, together with its inventor Jose Reixach, a velvet loom that was still giving trouble. It wove two fabrics face to face, but the problem lay in separating the layers so that the pile remained regular in length. Eventually Lister was inspired by watching a scissors grinder in the street to use small emery wheels to sharpen the cutters that divided the layers of fabric. Lister took out several patents for this loom in his own name in 1868 and 1869, while in 1871 he took out one jointly with Reixach. It is said that he spent £29,000 over an eleven-year period on this loom, but this was more than recouped from the sale of reasonably priced high-quality velvets and plushes once success was achieved. Manningham mills were greatly enlarged to accommodate this new manufacture.In later years Lister had an annual profit from his mills of £250,000, much of which was presented to Bradford city in gifts such as Lister Park, the original home of the Listers. He was connected with the Bradford Chamber of Commerce for many years and held the position of President of the Fair Trade League for some time. In 1887 he became High Sheriff of Yorkshire, and in 1891 he was made 1st Baron Masham. He was also Deputy Lieutenant in North and West Riding.[br]Principal Honours and DistinctionsCreated 1st Baron Masham 1891.Bibliography1849, with G.E.Donisthorpe, British patent no. 12,712. 1850, with G.E. Donisthorpe, British patent no. 13,009. 1851, British patent no. 13,532.1852, British patent no. 14,135.1877, British patent no. 3,600 (combing machine). 1868, British patent no. 470.1868, British patent no. 2,386.1868, British patent no. 2,429.1868, British patent no. 3,669.1868, British patent no. 1,549.1871, with J.Reixach, British patent no. 1,117. 1905, Lord Masham's Inventions (autobiography).Further ReadingJ.Hogg (ed.), c. 1888, Fortunes Made in Business, London (biography).W.English, 1969, The Textile Industry, London; and C.Singer (ed.), 1958, A History of Technology, Vol. IV, Oxford: Clarendon Press (both cover the technical details of Lister's invention).RLHBiographical history of technology > Lister, Samuel Cunliffe, 1st Baron Masham
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11 Thinking
But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. (Descartes, 1951, p. 153)I have been trying in all this to remove the temptation to think that there "must be" a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc.... If we scrutinize the usages which we make of "thinking," "meaning," "wishing," etc., going through this process rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some particular medium. (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 41-43)Analyse the proofs employed by the subject. If they do not go beyond observation of empirical correspondences, they can be fully explained in terms of concrete operations, and nothing would warrant our assuming that more complex thought mechanisms are operating. If, on the other hand, the subject interprets a given correspondence as the result of any one of several possible combinations, and this leads him to verify his hypotheses by observing their consequences, we know that propositional operations are involved. (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, p. 279)In every age, philosophical thinking exploits some dominant concepts and makes its greatest headway in solving problems conceived in terms of them. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers construed knowledge, knower, and known in terms of sense data and their association. Descartes' self-examination gave classical psychology the mind and its contents as a starting point. Locke set up sensory immediacy as the new criterion of the real... Hobbes provided the genetic method of building up complex ideas from simple ones... and, in another quarter, still true to the Hobbesian method, Pavlov built intellect out of conditioned reflexes and Loeb built life out of tropisms. (S. Langer, 1962, p. 54)Experiments on deductive reasoning show that subjects are influenced sufficiently by their experience for their reasoning to differ from that described by a purely deductive system, whilst experiments on inductive reasoning lead to the view that an understanding of the strategies used by adult subjects in attaining concepts involves reference to higher-order concepts of a logical and deductive nature. (Bolton, 1972, p. 154)There are now machines in the world that think, that learn and create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until-in the visible future-the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied. (Newell & Simon, quoted in Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 138)But how does it happen that thinking is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, and sometimes not? It looks as if almost the same thing happens as in the case of reasoning and making inferences about unchanging objects. But in that case the end is a speculative proposition... whereas here the conclusion which results from the two premises is an action.... I need covering; a cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make; I need a cloak. I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion, the "I have to make a cloak," is an action. (Nussbaum, 1978, p. 40)It is well to remember that when philosophy emerged in Greece in the sixth century, B.C., it did not burst suddenly out of the Mediterranean blue. The development of societies of reasoning creatures-what we call civilization-had been a process to be measured not in thousands but in millions of years. Human beings became civilized as they became reasonable, and for an animal to begin to reason and to learn how to improve its reasoning is a long, slow process. So thinking had been going on for ages before Greece-slowly improving itself, uncovering the pitfalls to be avoided by forethought, endeavoring to weigh alternative sets of consequences intellectually. What happened in the sixth century, B.C., is that thinking turned round on itself; people began to think about thinking, and the momentous event, the culmination of the long process to that point, was in fact the birth of philosophy. (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980, p. xi)The way to look at thought is not to assume that there is a parallel thread of correlated affects or internal experiences that go with it in some regular way. It's not of course that people don't have internal experiences, of course they do; but that when you ask what is the state of mind of someone, say while he or she is performing a ritual, it's hard to believe that such experiences are the same for all people involved.... The thinking, and indeed the feeling in an odd sort of way, is really going on in public. They are really saying what they're saying, doing what they're doing, meaning what they're meaning. Thought is, in great part anyway, a public activity. (Geertz, quoted in J. Miller, 1983, pp. 202-203)Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. (Einstein, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 17)What, in effect, are the conditions for the construction of formal thought? The child must not only apply operations to objects-in other words, mentally execute possible actions on them-he must also "reflect" those operations in the absence of the objects which are replaced by pure propositions. Thus, "reflection" is thought raised to the second power. Concrete thinking is the representation of a possible action, and formal thinking is the representation of a representation of possible action.... It is not surprising, therefore, that the system of concrete operations must be completed during the last years of childhood before it can be "reflected" by formal operations. In terms of their function, formal operations do not differ from concrete operations except that they are applied to hypotheses or propositions [whose logic is] an abstract translation of the system of "inference" that governs concrete operations. (Piaget, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 237)[E]ven a human being today (hence, a fortiori, a remote ancestor of contemporary human beings) cannot easily or ordinarily maintain uninterrupted attention on a single problem for more than a few tens of seconds. Yet we work on problems that require vastly more time. The way we do that (as we can observe by watching ourselves) requires periods of mulling to be followed by periods of recapitulation, describing to ourselves what seems to have gone on during the mulling, leading to whatever intermediate results we have reached. This has an obvious function: namely, by rehearsing these interim results... we commit them to memory, for the immediate contents of the stream of consciousness are very quickly lost unless rehearsed.... Given language, we can describe to ourselves what seemed to occur during the mulling that led to a judgment, produce a rehearsable version of the reaching-a-judgment process, and commit that to long-term memory by in fact rehearsing it. (Margolis, 1987, p. 60)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Thinking
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12 adecuado
adj.adequate, appropriate, becoming, apt.past part.past participle of spanish verb: adecuar.* * *1→ link=adecuar adecuar► adjetivo1 adequate, suitable, appropriate* * *(f. - adecuada)adj.* * *ADJ1) (=apropiado) [actitud, respuesta, ropa, tratamiento] appropriate; [documento, requisito] appropriate, relevantes el traje más adecuado para la primavera — it is the most suitable o appropriate outfit for spring
exigen un uso adecuado de los recursos — they are demanding that resources be used appropriately o properly
lo más adecuado sería... — the best thing o the most appropriate thing would be to...
2) (=acorde)adecuado a algo: un precio adecuado a mis posibilidades — a price within my budget o reach
3) (=suficiente) [dinero, tiempo] sufficient* * *- da adjetivoa) ( apropiado)no disponemos de los medios adecuados — we do not have adequate o the necessary resources
b) ( aceptable) adequate* * *= adequate, appropriate, apt, desirable, suitable, competent, convenient, correct, eligible, felicitous, fine [finer -comp., finest -sup.], fit [fitter -comp., fittest -sup.], proper, successful, timely, fitting, commensurate, accommodating, timely, fit for purpose, beffiting.Ex. There must be provision for changes necessary to keep the coverage of subjects adequate for new literature.Ex. Informative abstracts are appropriate for texts describing experimental work.Ex. By building upon a more apt conceptual framework the transfer of information technology can play a role, albeit limited, in the development process.Ex. It is desirable that they be treated as parts of a single serials record, since this will provide a 'one-stop' file containing all the relevant data, and will produce a file with a number of funtions.Ex. The approach which is suitable in specialised indexing tools for medical research will need to be very specific in order to differentiate between two closely related subjects.Ex. Those responsible in libraries must ensure that the users are given competent advice.Ex. The most convenient manual format for recording terms is to write each term on a card.Ex. If an entry with cross-references or notes must be corrected, add the correct form and then delete the incorrect form.Ex. And yet, everyone knows that historically only a very small portion of the eligible users have ever crossed the threshold of a public library.Ex. This is hardly a felicitous solution to be followed in other similar cases.Ex. The solution is fine when the qualifying term that the user seeks is present, and is used relatively consistently.Ex. That was considered to be a fit matter to be relegated to the machines.Ex. With proper authorization, you may request information about the status of the copies displayed.Ex. Someone's off-the-cuff idea may be the clue that will tap another's thought and lead to a successful solution.Ex. I believe that the issues brought forth and debated in the following papers and discussions are as timely today as they were when the institutes were first held.Ex. Since libraries are the lifeblood of research, it seems only fitting then that the education of librarians should include familiarity with research methodology.Ex. For their indifference, they were rewarded with personnel evaluations which reflected an imaginatively fabricated version of the truth, but which did afford the requisite ego boost and commensurate pay increase.Ex. Monitors tuned to television news may have to be located in areas that are less than accommodating to the large numbers of users who want to know the fast-breaking events which affect us all.Ex. I am not very good at fortune telling but I suspect it may be timely for people to communicate briefly on strategy and options with him.Ex. Commercial pressures are placing demands on the designer to provide solutions which are fit for purpose for all user groups.Ex. Since I write in English I should really refer to the city as Florence, but Firenze is such a phonically beautiful sounding word, far more befitting of the beautiful Italian city.----* adecuado para = accommodative to, well suited to/for.* considerar adecuado = judge + suitable, consider + appropriate.* creer adecuado = see + fit, think + fit.* de forma adecuada = adequately, fitly, appropriately.* de un modo adecuado = appropriately, fitly.* el más adecuado = ideally suited.* el + Nombre + correcto al + Nombre + adecuado en el momento oportuno = the right + Nombre + to the right + Nombre + at the right time.* en el momento adecuado = at the right time.* estar en el lugar adecuado en el momento adecuado = be in the right place at the right time.* lo adecuado = adequacy.* no ser lo más adecuado para = ill suited to/for.* poco adecuado = unsuited, unsuitable, inapt.* prácticas más adecuadas = lessons learned [lessons learnt], best practices.* proporcionar el + Nombre + adecuado al + Nombre + adecuado en el m = provide + the right + Nombre + to the right + Nombre + at the right time.* resultar adecuado = prove + suitable.* ser adecuado = be right, stand up.* * *- da adjetivoa) ( apropiado)no disponemos de los medios adecuados — we do not have adequate o the necessary resources
b) ( aceptable) adequate* * *= adequate, appropriate, apt, desirable, suitable, competent, convenient, correct, eligible, felicitous, fine [finer -comp., finest -sup.], fit [fitter -comp., fittest -sup.], proper, successful, timely, fitting, commensurate, accommodating, timely, fit for purpose, beffiting.Ex: There must be provision for changes necessary to keep the coverage of subjects adequate for new literature.
Ex: Informative abstracts are appropriate for texts describing experimental work.Ex: By building upon a more apt conceptual framework the transfer of information technology can play a role, albeit limited, in the development process.Ex: It is desirable that they be treated as parts of a single serials record, since this will provide a 'one-stop' file containing all the relevant data, and will produce a file with a number of funtions.Ex: The approach which is suitable in specialised indexing tools for medical research will need to be very specific in order to differentiate between two closely related subjects.Ex: Those responsible in libraries must ensure that the users are given competent advice.Ex: The most convenient manual format for recording terms is to write each term on a card.Ex: If an entry with cross-references or notes must be corrected, add the correct form and then delete the incorrect form.Ex: And yet, everyone knows that historically only a very small portion of the eligible users have ever crossed the threshold of a public library.Ex: This is hardly a felicitous solution to be followed in other similar cases.Ex: The solution is fine when the qualifying term that the user seeks is present, and is used relatively consistently.Ex: That was considered to be a fit matter to be relegated to the machines.Ex: With proper authorization, you may request information about the status of the copies displayed.Ex: Someone's off-the-cuff idea may be the clue that will tap another's thought and lead to a successful solution.Ex: I believe that the issues brought forth and debated in the following papers and discussions are as timely today as they were when the institutes were first held.Ex: Since libraries are the lifeblood of research, it seems only fitting then that the education of librarians should include familiarity with research methodology.Ex: For their indifference, they were rewarded with personnel evaluations which reflected an imaginatively fabricated version of the truth, but which did afford the requisite ego boost and commensurate pay increase.Ex: Monitors tuned to television news may have to be located in areas that are less than accommodating to the large numbers of users who want to know the fast-breaking events which affect us all.Ex: I am not very good at fortune telling but I suspect it may be timely for people to communicate briefly on strategy and options with him.Ex: Commercial pressures are placing demands on the designer to provide solutions which are fit for purpose for all user groups.Ex: Since I write in English I should really refer to the city as Florence, but Firenze is such a phonically beautiful sounding word, far more befitting of the beautiful Italian city.* adecuado para = accommodative to, well suited to/for.* considerar adecuado = judge + suitable, consider + appropriate.* creer adecuado = see + fit, think + fit.* de forma adecuada = adequately, fitly, appropriately.* de un modo adecuado = appropriately, fitly.* el más adecuado = ideally suited.* el + Nombre + correcto al + Nombre + adecuado en el momento oportuno = the right + Nombre + to the right + Nombre + at the right time.* en el momento adecuado = at the right time.* estar en el lugar adecuado en el momento adecuado = be in the right place at the right time.* lo adecuado = adequacy.* no ser lo más adecuado para = ill suited to/for.* poco adecuado = unsuited, unsuitable, inapt.* prácticas más adecuadas = lessons learned [lessons learnt], best practices.* proporcionar el + Nombre + adecuado al + Nombre + adecuado en el m = provide + the right + Nombre + to the right + Nombre + at the right time.* resultar adecuado = prove + suitable.* ser adecuado = be right, stand up.* * *adecuado -da1(apropiado): me parece poco adecuado para una ocasión así I don't think it is very suitable for such an occasiones la persona más adecuada para este trabajo she is the best person o the most suitable person for the job o to do the jobéste no es el momento adecuado this is not the right momentno disponemos de los medios adecuados para realizar el trabajo we do not have adequate o the necessary resources to carry out the work2 (aceptable) adequate* * *
Del verbo adecuar: ( conjugate adecuar)
adecuado es:
el participio
Multiple Entries:
adecuado
adecuar
adecuado◊ -da adjetivo
‹ momento› right;
‹ medios› adequate;
adecuar ( conjugate adecuar) verbo transitivo adecuado algo a algo to adapt sth to sth
adecuado,-a adjetivo appropriate, suitable
adecuar verbo transitivo to adapt
' adecuado' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
adecuada
- aparente
- apta
- apto
- corresponder
- distribuir
- encontrar
- justa
- justo
- microclima
- momento
- pertinente
- propia
- propio
- bien
- indicado
- planteamiento
English:
adequate
- appropriate
- beginner
- due
- fit
- fitting
- proper
- suitable
- undue
- unsuitable
- right
- suited
* * *adecuado, -a adjappropriate, suitable;muchos niños no reciben una alimentación adecuada many children do not have a proper diet;ponte un traje adecuado para la ceremonia wear something suitable for the ceremony;no es un hombre adecuado para ella he's not the right sort of man for her;el sistema actual no es el adecuado the current system isn't the right one;no creo que este sea el lugar más adecuado para discutir del tema I don't think this is the best o right place to discuss the matter;repartieron los fondos de forma adecuada they shared out the funds appropriately* * *adj suitable, appropriate* * *adecuado, -da adj1) idóneo: suitable, appropriate2) : adequate* * *adecuado adj right / suitable -
13 alinear
v.1 to line up.2 to include in the starting line-up (sport) (seleccionar).3 to align, to range.Yo alineo los rieles I align the rails.4 to straighten, to put straight.Yo alineo las piezas de dominó I straighten the domino pieces.5 to range in rows, to set in line, to line up, to put in line.Ella alinea las latas del estante She ranges the shelf cans in rows.* * *1 (poner en línea) to align, line up2 DEPORTE to pick, select3 MILITAR to form up2 MILITAR to fall in* * *verb* * *1.VT (Téc) to align; [+ alumnos] to line up, put into line; [+ soldados] to form up; (Dep) [+ equipo] to select, pick ( con with)2.See:* * *1.verbo transitivo1) <equipo/jugador> to select, pick2) (poner en fila, línea) to line up3) (Tec) to align, line up2.alinearse v prona) tropa to fall in; niños/presos to line upb) (Pol, Rels Labs)alinearse con algo/alguien — to align oneself with something/somebody
* * *= align, line up, justify, estrange (from).Ex. Entry words may be aligned in a centre column or in a left hand column.Ex. When an object appears in that square, it is lined up for its picture.Ex. The weaknesses of the cold-metal machines were that they did not justify the lines automatically as part of the type-setting process.Ex. These objects remain useful and functional, though estranged from their usual context.----* alinear a la derecha = justify + right.* alinearse a = align.* sin alinear = unjustified.* * *1.verbo transitivo1) <equipo/jugador> to select, pick2) (poner en fila, línea) to line up3) (Tec) to align, line up2.alinearse v prona) tropa to fall in; niños/presos to line upb) (Pol, Rels Labs)alinearse con algo/alguien — to align oneself with something/somebody
* * *= align, line up, justify, estrange (from).Ex: Entry words may be aligned in a centre column or in a left hand column.
Ex: When an object appears in that square, it is lined up for its picture.Ex: The weaknesses of the cold-metal machines were that they did not justify the lines automatically as part of the type-setting process.Ex: These objects remain useful and functional, though estranged from their usual context.* alinear a la derecha = justify + right.* alinearse a = align.* sin alinear = unjustified.* * *alinear [A1 ]vtA ‹equipo/jugador› to select, pickB (poner en fila, línea) ‹personas› to line up; ‹objetos› to line up, arrange ( o put etc) … in a lineC ( Tec) to align, line upalinear la dirección or las ruedas del coche to align the wheels of the car1 «tropa» ( Mil) to fall in; «niños/presos» to line uppaíses no alineados nonaligned countries* * *
alinear ( conjugate alinear) verbo transitivo
1 ‹equipo/jugador› to select, pick
2
alinearse verbo pronominal [ tropa] to fall in;
[niños/presos] to line up
alinear verbo transitivo
1 (poner en línea) to line up, align
2 Dep (a un jugador) to select
' alinear' also found in these entries:
English:
align
- line up
- range
- draw
- line
* * *♦ vt1. [colocar en línea] to line up2. [ruedas] to align* * *v/t1 line up, align2 DEP select3:países no alineados POL non-aligned countries* * *alinear vt1) : to align2) : to line up -
14 apropiado
adj.1 appropriate, convenient, apt, fit.2 appropriate, correct.past part.past participle of spanish verb: apropiar.* * *1→ link=apropiar apropiar► adjetivo1 suitable, fitting, appropriate* * *(f. - apropiada)adj.appropriate, suitable* * *ADJ appropriate ( para for)suitable ( para for)* * *- da adjetivo suitablepodrías haber elegido un momento más apropiado! — you could have chosen a better o (frml) more appropriate time
* * *= apposite, appropriate, apt, convenient, felicitous, fit [fitter -comp., fittest -sup.], proper, right, fitting, fertile, commensurate, rightful, seemly, accommodating, timely, beffiting.Ex. All terms may be included, and placed in the most apposite position in the hierarchy of the subject = Pueden incluirse todos los términos y colocarse en la posición más apropiada en la jerarquía de la materia.Ex. Informative abstracts are appropriate for texts describing experimental work.Ex. By building upon a more apt conceptual framework the transfer of information technology can play a role, albeit limited, in the development process.Ex. The most convenient manual format for recording terms is to write each term on a card.Ex. This is hardly a felicitous solution to be followed in other similar cases.Ex. That was considered to be a fit matter to be relegated to the machines.Ex. With proper authorization, you may request information about the status of the copies displayed.Ex. The last figure I saw was 828, but you're in the right realm.Ex. Since libraries are the lifeblood of research, it seems only fitting then that the education of librarians should include familiarity with research methodology.Ex. There is no doubt that these reforms have produced a fertile climate for the development of better information for patients.Ex. For their indifference, they were rewarded with personnel evaluations which reflected an imaginatively fabricated version of the truth, but which did afford the requisite ego boost and commensurate pay increase.Ex. Use of a library is a minority event since only a small segment of rightful users of a library really makes use of it.Ex. They were the first cloth bindings that were intended to compete with paper boards as seemly but inexpensive covers for ordinary books.Ex. Monitors tuned to television news may have to be located in areas that are less than accommodating to the large numbers of users who want to know the fast-breaking events which affect us all.Ex. I am not very good at fortune telling but I suspect it may be timely for people to communicate briefly on strategy and options with him.Ex. Since I write in English I should really refer to the city as Florence, but Firenze is such a phonically beautiful sounding word, far more befitting of the beautiful Italian city.----* apropiado para = well suited to/for.* considerar apropiado = consider + appropriate.* de forma apropiada = fitly, appropriately.* de modo apropiado = appropriately.* de un modo apropiado = fitly.* lo apropiado = appropriateness.* momento apropiado para el aprendizaje, el = teachable moment, the.* no muy apropiado = wide of the mark.* poco apropiado = unsuited, unsuitable, inapt.* ser apropiado = be right.* vestimenta apropiada para la lluvia = raingear.* * *- da adjetivo suitablepodrías haber elegido un momento más apropiado! — you could have chosen a better o (frml) more appropriate time
* * *= apposite, appropriate, apt, convenient, felicitous, fit [fitter -comp., fittest -sup.], proper, right, fitting, fertile, commensurate, rightful, seemly, accommodating, timely, beffiting.Ex: All terms may be included, and placed in the most apposite position in the hierarchy of the subject = Pueden incluirse todos los términos y colocarse en la posición más apropiada en la jerarquía de la materia.
Ex: Informative abstracts are appropriate for texts describing experimental work.Ex: By building upon a more apt conceptual framework the transfer of information technology can play a role, albeit limited, in the development process.Ex: The most convenient manual format for recording terms is to write each term on a card.Ex: This is hardly a felicitous solution to be followed in other similar cases.Ex: That was considered to be a fit matter to be relegated to the machines.Ex: With proper authorization, you may request information about the status of the copies displayed.Ex: The last figure I saw was 828, but you're in the right realm.Ex: Since libraries are the lifeblood of research, it seems only fitting then that the education of librarians should include familiarity with research methodology.Ex: There is no doubt that these reforms have produced a fertile climate for the development of better information for patients.Ex: For their indifference, they were rewarded with personnel evaluations which reflected an imaginatively fabricated version of the truth, but which did afford the requisite ego boost and commensurate pay increase.Ex: Use of a library is a minority event since only a small segment of rightful users of a library really makes use of it.Ex: They were the first cloth bindings that were intended to compete with paper boards as seemly but inexpensive covers for ordinary books.Ex: Monitors tuned to television news may have to be located in areas that are less than accommodating to the large numbers of users who want to know the fast-breaking events which affect us all.Ex: I am not very good at fortune telling but I suspect it may be timely for people to communicate briefly on strategy and options with him.Ex: Since I write in English I should really refer to the city as Florence, but Firenze is such a phonically beautiful sounding word, far more befitting of the beautiful Italian city.* apropiado para = well suited to/for.* considerar apropiado = consider + appropriate.* de forma apropiada = fitly, appropriately.* de modo apropiado = appropriately.* de un modo apropiado = fitly.* lo apropiado = appropriateness.* momento apropiado para el aprendizaje, el = teachable moment, the.* no muy apropiado = wide of the mark.* poco apropiado = unsuited, unsuitable, inapt.* ser apropiado = be right.* vestimenta apropiada para la lluvia = raingear.* * *apropiado -dasuitablellevaba un vestido muy poco apropiado para una boda the dress she was wearing was very inappropriate o unsuitable for a weddingel discurso fue muy apropiado a la ocasión the speech was very fitting for the occasionla persona apropiada para el cargo the right person o a suitable person for the jobeste libro no es apropiado para tu edad this book is unsuitable for someone of your age¡podrías haber elegido un momento más apropiado! you could have chosen a better o ( frml) more appropriate time* * *
Del verbo apropiar: ( conjugate apropiar)
apropiado es:
el participio
apropiado◊ -da adjetivo
suitable;
el discurso fue muy apropiado a la ocasión the speech was very fitting for the occasion;
no era el momento apropiado it wasn't the right moment
apropiado,-a adjetivo suitable, appropriate
' apropiado' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
apropiada
- digna
- digno
- vestir
- adecuado
- debido
- recomendado
English:
appropriate
- apt
- becoming
- dishwasherproof
- fitting
- happy
- inappropriate
- right
- suit
- suitability
- suitable
- suited
- become
- proper
- unsuitable
- where
* * *apropiado, -a adjsuitable, appropriate;su comportamiento no fue muy apropiado his behaviour was rather inappropriate;estos zapatos no son apropiados para la playa these shoes aren't very suitable for the beach;no es la persona apropiada para el puesto he's not the right person for the job* * *adj appropriate, suitable* * *apropiado, -da adj: appropriate, proper, suitable♦ apropiadamente adv* * *apropiado adj appropriate / suitable -
15 de baja calidad
(adj.) = poor in detail, low-grade [lowgrade], low-quality, third rate [third-rate], low-end, trashy [trashier -comp., trashiest -sup.]Ex. This process is slow and the resulting picture is poor in detail.Ex. The amount of stuffing in the balls was varied to suit the nature of the work; large, soft balls with weak ink were used for low-grade work; small, hard balls and strong ink for work of better quality.Ex. Low-quality information can be downright misleading or distorted.Ex. The quality of the material published has often been regarded as second or third rate, a criticism less justified today.Ex. Therefore real time interaction is feasible on both low-end and high-end machines.Ex. Wilensky has argued that 'the good, the mediocre and the trashy are becoming fused in one massive middle mush' and that 'intellectuals are increasingly tempted to play to mass audiences'.* * *(adj.) = poor in detail, low-grade [lowgrade], low-quality, third rate [third-rate], low-end, trashy [trashier -comp., trashiest -sup.]Ex: This process is slow and the resulting picture is poor in detail.
Ex: The amount of stuffing in the balls was varied to suit the nature of the work; large, soft balls with weak ink were used for low-grade work; small, hard balls and strong ink for work of better quality.Ex: Low-quality information can be downright misleading or distorted.Ex: The quality of the material published has often been regarded as second or third rate, a criticism less justified today.Ex: Therefore real time interaction is feasible on both low-end and high-end machines.Ex: Wilensky has argued that 'the good, the mediocre and the trashy are becoming fused in one massive middle mush' and that 'intellectuals are increasingly tempted to play to mass audiences'. -
16 funcionar
v.1 to work, to run (machine).funciona a pilas it works o runs off batteriesEl motor anda bien The engine is working well.2 to work for.Me funcionó la idea The idea worked for me.* * *1 (desempeñar una función) to work, function■ funciona con gasolina/diesel it runs on petrol/diesel\hacer funcionar algo to operate something'No funciona' "Out of order"* * *verb1) to function2) run, work* * *VI1) [aparato, mecanismo] to work; [motor] to work, run; [sistema] to work, function¿cómo funciona el vídeo? — how does the video work?, how do you work the video?
2) [plan, método] to work; [negocio, película] to be a successsu primer matrimonio no funcionó — her first marriage did not work out o was not a success
su última novela no ha funcionado tan bien como la anterior — his latest novel hasn't been as successful o as much of a success as the previous one
* * *¿cómo funciona esto? — how does this work?
funcionar con pilas/gasolina — to run off batteries/on gasoline
* * *= be operational, be operative, function, operate, perform, work, be in working order, tick, do + the trick.Ex. ORBIT has been operational since 1972, and has around seventy data bases mounted.Ex. Sometimes truncation may be operative on both ends of a stem.Ex. The DOBIS/LIBIS allows both the library and the computer center to function efficiently and at a lower cost by sharing one system.Ex. These references operate in a similar fashion whether they are used to link authors' names or subject headings.Ex. The advanced arithmetical machines of the future will be electrical in nature, and they will perform at 100 times present speeds, or more.Ex. Files only work effectively for a limited number of documents.Ex. It is therefore a point of wisdom to ensure beforehand that everything is in the best possible working order.Ex. The article 'Is your infrastructure ticking?' discusses the issues associated with managing information technology (IT) infrastructure in large organizations.Ex. We are currently in the process of looking at two products that seem to do the trick.----* dejar de funcionar = go down, cease to + function, go + belly up, flake out, go + dead, pack up.* empezar a funcionar = become + operational, get off + the ground, get + rolling, get + things going, get + things rolling, go + live, get + the ball rolling, set + the ball rolling, start + the ball rolling.* forma de funcionar = business model.* funcionar además como = double as, double up as.* funcionar a las mil maravillas = work + a treat, work like + a charm, go like + a charm.* funcionar al máximo = stretch + Nombre + to the limit.* funcionar a plena capacidad = be fully into + Posesivo + stride.* funcionar a tope = stretch + Nombre + to the limit.* funcionar bien = be in order.* funcionar con dificultad = labour [labor, -USA].* funcionar conjuntamente = work together, interwork.* funcionar con pérdidas = run + at a loss.* funcionar de lo lindo = work like + a charm, go like + a charm.* funcionar de un modo autónomo = operate under + an autonomous hand.* funcionar en/a = run over.* funcionar mal = malfunction.* funcionar mejor = work + best, do + best.* funcionar por un sistema de turnos = work to + a rota system, work on + a rota system, work on + a rota, work + shifts.* funcionar recíprocamente = work + both ways.* funcionar también como = double as, double up as.* hacer Algo funcionar = make + Nombre + tick.* hacer funcionar = service, do + the trick.* hacer que Algo empiece a funcionar = get + Nombre + off the ground.* hacer que Algo funcione = make + Nombre + spin.* mantener las cosas funcionando = keep + it rolling.* máquina que funciona con monedas = coin-operated machine.* no funcionar = be out of order.* programa + dejar de funcionar = programme + crash.* que funciona a base de órdenes = command-driven.* que funciona con electricidad = electrically-powered, electrically-operated.* que funciona con energía eólica = wind-powered.* que funciona con monedas = coin-operated, coin-op.* que funciona con vapor = steam-powered.* que funciona manualmente = manually operated.* sistema + dejar de funcionar = system + crash.* volver a funcionar = be back in business.* * *¿cómo funciona esto? — how does this work?
funcionar con pilas/gasolina — to run off batteries/on gasoline
* * *= be operational, be operative, function, operate, perform, work, be in working order, tick, do + the trick.Ex: ORBIT has been operational since 1972, and has around seventy data bases mounted.
Ex: Sometimes truncation may be operative on both ends of a stem.Ex: The DOBIS/LIBIS allows both the library and the computer center to function efficiently and at a lower cost by sharing one system.Ex: These references operate in a similar fashion whether they are used to link authors' names or subject headings.Ex: The advanced arithmetical machines of the future will be electrical in nature, and they will perform at 100 times present speeds, or more.Ex: Files only work effectively for a limited number of documents.Ex: It is therefore a point of wisdom to ensure beforehand that everything is in the best possible working order.Ex: The article 'Is your infrastructure ticking?' discusses the issues associated with managing information technology (IT) infrastructure in large organizations.Ex: We are currently in the process of looking at two products that seem to do the trick.* dejar de funcionar = go down, cease to + function, go + belly up, flake out, go + dead, pack up.* empezar a funcionar = become + operational, get off + the ground, get + rolling, get + things going, get + things rolling, go + live, get + the ball rolling, set + the ball rolling, start + the ball rolling.* forma de funcionar = business model.* funcionar además como = double as, double up as.* funcionar a las mil maravillas = work + a treat, work like + a charm, go like + a charm.* funcionar al máximo = stretch + Nombre + to the limit.* funcionar a plena capacidad = be fully into + Posesivo + stride.* funcionar a tope = stretch + Nombre + to the limit.* funcionar bien = be in order.* funcionar con dificultad = labour [labor, -USA].* funcionar conjuntamente = work together, interwork.* funcionar con pérdidas = run + at a loss.* funcionar de lo lindo = work like + a charm, go like + a charm.* funcionar de un modo autónomo = operate under + an autonomous hand.* funcionar en/a = run over.* funcionar mal = malfunction.* funcionar mejor = work + best, do + best.* funcionar por un sistema de turnos = work to + a rota system, work on + a rota system, work on + a rota, work + shifts.* funcionar recíprocamente = work + both ways.* funcionar también como = double as, double up as.* hacer Algo funcionar = make + Nombre + tick.* hacer funcionar = service, do + the trick.* hacer que Algo empiece a funcionar = get + Nombre + off the ground.* hacer que Algo funcione = make + Nombre + spin.* mantener las cosas funcionando = keep + it rolling.* máquina que funciona con monedas = coin-operated machine.* no funcionar = be out of order.* programa + dejar de funcionar = programme + crash.* que funciona a base de órdenes = command-driven.* que funciona con electricidad = electrically-powered, electrically-operated.* que funciona con energía eólica = wind-powered.* que funciona con monedas = coin-operated, coin-op.* que funciona con vapor = steam-powered.* que funciona manualmente = manually operated.* sistema + dejar de funcionar = system + crash.* volver a funcionar = be back in business.* * *funcionar [A1 ]vito workel reloj funciona a la perfección the clock works perfectly¿cómo funciona este cacharro? how does this thing work?[ S ] no funciona out of orderla relación no funcionaba their relationship wasn't working (out) ( colloq)el servicio no puede funcionar con tan poco personal the service cannot operate o function with so few stafffunciona con pilas it works on o runs off batteries* * *
funcionar ( conjugate funcionar) verbo intransitivo [aparato/máquina] to work;
[ servicio] to operate;
( on signs) no funciona out of order;◊ funcionar con pilas/gasolina to run off batteries/on gasoline
funcionar verbo intransitivo to work: no funciona, (en letrero) out of order
' funcionar' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
andar
- deteriorarse
- evolucionar
- ir
- marchar
- poner
- resultar
- vez
- bien
- carburar
English:
act
- act up
- behave
- dare
- function
- get
- go
- malfunction
- need
- operate
- perform
- run
- work
- develop
- die
- drive
- flush
- pack
- play
- turn
* * *funcionar vito work;el sistema funciona de maravilla the system works superbly;no funciona [en letrero] out of order;su matrimonio no está funcionando their marriage isn't working (out);conmigo los lloros no funcionan you won't get anywhere with me by crying* * *v/i work;no funciona out of order* * *funcionar vi1) : to function2) : to run, to work* * *funcionar vb1. (en general) to work"no funciona" "out of order" -
17 justificar
v.to justify (gen) & (Imprenta).Ella justifica a su hijo She justifies her son.Ella justifica su proceder She justifies her actions.Ella justifica el texto She justifies the text.Su acción justifica el premio His action justifies=merits the award.* * *1 (acción) to justify2 (persona) to excuse\justificarse con alguien to apologize to somebody* * *verb* * *1. VT1) (=explicar) to account for, explaintendrá que justificar su ausencia del trabajo — she will have to account for o explain her absence from work
el gobierno no pudo justificar el aumento del gasto — the government was unable to account for o explain the increase in expenditure
2) (=excusar) [+ decisión, comportamiento] to justify, excusenada justifica tal violencia — nothing can justify o excuse such violence
es un criminal y no pretendo justificarlo — he's a criminal and I'm not trying to make excuses for him
3) (Inform, Tip) to justify2.See:* * *1.verbo transitivo1)a) persona <ausencia/acción> to justifyc) situación/circunstancia to justifyeso no justifica su actitud — that does not justify o that is no excuse for her attitude
2) (Impr) to justify2.justificarse v pron to justify oneself, excuse oneself* * *= build + a case for, justify, make + apology, warrant, justify, excuse, vindicate.Ex. Then, with a kind of energetic abruptness, Bough said that they could try to build a case for keeping the budget intact.Ex. The time has arrived when it is more appropriate to ask why cataloguing is still conducted on a manual basis, rather than to seek to justify the use of computers in cataloguing.Ex. My perspective, for which I make no apology, is that of someone who works daily with the nitty-gritty of cataloging, as many of you do.Ex. Such broad selection may also warrant the use of go-and stop-lists.Ex. The weaknesses of the cold-metal machines were that they did not justify the lines automatically as part of the type-setting process.Ex. Librarians could be excused for wondering if there is any role for them to play in the virtual library environment.Ex. The relevance to a local library situation of British Library Lending Division data on periodical usage is vindicated.----* el fin justifica los medios = the end justifies the means.* justificar a la derecha = justify + right.* justificar Algo = argue + Posesivo + corner.* justificar el esfuerzo = justify + the effort.* justificar la existencia = justify + Posesivo + existence.* justificar la necesidad de = justify + the case for.* sin justificar = unjustified.* * *1.verbo transitivo1)a) persona <ausencia/acción> to justifyc) situación/circunstancia to justifyeso no justifica su actitud — that does not justify o that is no excuse for her attitude
2) (Impr) to justify2.justificarse v pron to justify oneself, excuse oneself* * *= build + a case for, justify, make + apology, warrant, justify, excuse, vindicate.Ex: Then, with a kind of energetic abruptness, Bough said that they could try to build a case for keeping the budget intact.
Ex: The time has arrived when it is more appropriate to ask why cataloguing is still conducted on a manual basis, rather than to seek to justify the use of computers in cataloguing.Ex: My perspective, for which I make no apology, is that of someone who works daily with the nitty-gritty of cataloging, as many of you do.Ex: Such broad selection may also warrant the use of go-and stop-lists.Ex: The weaknesses of the cold-metal machines were that they did not justify the lines automatically as part of the type-setting process.Ex: Librarians could be excused for wondering if there is any role for them to play in the virtual library environment.Ex: The relevance to a local library situation of British Library Lending Division data on periodical usage is vindicated.* el fin justifica los medios = the end justifies the means.* justificar a la derecha = justify + right.* justificar Algo = argue + Posesivo + corner.* justificar el esfuerzo = justify + the effort.* justificar la existencia = justify + Posesivo + existence.* justificar la necesidad de = justify + the case for.* sin justificar = unjustified.* * *justificar [A2 ]vtA1 «persona» ‹ausencia/acción› to justifyjustificó su ausencia diciendo que … he justified o excused his absence by saying that …2 (disculpar) ‹persona› to find o make excuses for3 «situación/circunstancia» to justifyno justifica su actitud it does not justify her attitude, it is no excuse for her attitudesus sospechas no estaban justificadas his suspicions were not justifiedtrabajar por tan poco dinero no se justifica working for such low wages just isn't worth itB ( Impr) to justifyto justify oneself, excuse oneselfno intentes justificarte don't try to justify yourself o make excuses for yourselfyo no tengo por qué justificarme por algo que no he hecho I have no reason to apologize for something I did not do* * *
justificar ( conjugate justificar) verbo transitivo
sus sospechas no estaban justificadas his suspicions were not justified;
trabajar por tan poco no se justifica it isn't worth working for so little
justificarse verbo pronominal
to justify oneself, excuse oneself
justificar verbo transitivo to justify
' justificar' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
pertinencia
English:
account for
- condone
- excuse
- justify
- leg
- legitimate
- vindicate
- warrant
* * *♦ vt1. [probar] to justify;justifiqué todos los gastos I accounted for all the expenses2. [hacer admisible] to justify;con sus treinta goles justificó el costo de su fichaje his thirty goals justified o made up for the size of his transfer feeque estuviera cansado no justifica su comportamiento the fact that he was tired doesn't justify o excuse his behaviour4. Imprenta to justify* * *v/t2 TIP justify* * *justificar {72} vt1) : to justify2) : to excuse, to vindicate* * *justificar vb to justify [pt. & pp. justified] -
18 Thompson, A.
SUBJECT AREA: Textiles[br]fl. c. 1801 London, England[br]English patentee of one of the first significant machines for heckling flax.[br]The flax plant passes through many stages before its fibres are prepared for spinning. The woody pith surrounding the fibres is first softened by rotting or "retting", and is then removed by beating or "scutching". This leaves the fibres in a tight bunch, as they have grown to form the stem of the plant. Hackling or heckling, the next process, separates the fibres from each other. In hand processes this was done by pulling the fibres across a board of steel spikes, or sometimes a form of comb was pulled through them.In 1795 Sellers and Standage patented a method of heckling in which the flax was pulled by hand through stationary vertical teeth, but much more significant was the patent of 1801 of A.Thompson of London. The length of the fibres in a bundle of flax will vary considerably, therefore the distance between the point where the fibres pass out to be combed and the point where they can be put through another roller or gripper must be greater than the longest fibres, requiring some method of support in between. Thompson used a pair of chain gills for this purpose. These consist of rows of teeth mounted on a continuous chain or belt which moves around while the fibres pass through the teeth in the vertical position. The longer fibres are pulled through the teeth by the drawing rollers at the front, while the shorter ones are held steady by the teeth and presented to the rollers later; thus the teeth both support the fibres and heckle them at the same time. Following this process the fibres can be drawn and spun.[br]Bibliography1801, British patent no. 2,533 (flax-heckling machine).Further ReadingW.English, 1969, The Textile Industry, London (describes Thompson's machine, with an illustration).L.J.Mills (ed.), 1927, The Textile Educator, London (includes a description of later flax-heckling machines).RLH -
19 Woolrich, John Stephen
[br]b. 1821 Birmingham, Englandd. 27 February 1850 King's Norton, England[br]English chemist who found in the electroplating process one of the earliest commercial applications of the magneto-electric generator.[br]The son of a Birmingham chemist, Woolrich was educated at King Edward's Grammar School, Birmingham, and later became a lecturer in chemistry. As an alternative to primary cells for the supply of current for electroplating, he devised a magneto generator.His original machine had a single compound permanent magnet; the distance between the revolving armature and the magnet could be varied to adjust the rate of deposition of metal. A more ambitious machine designed by Woolrich was constructed by Thomas Prime \& Sons in 1844 and for many years was used at their Birmingham electroplating works. Faraday, on a visit to see the machine at work, is said to have expressed delight at his discovery of electromagnetic induction being put to practical use so soon. Similar machines were in use by Elkington's, Fern and others in Birmingham and Sheffield. One of Woolrich's machines is preserved in the Birmingham Science Museum.[br]Bibliography1 August 1842, British patent no. 9,431 (the electroplating process; describes the magnetic apparatus and the electroplating chemicals).Further Reading1843, Mechanics Magazine 38:145–9 (fully describes the Woolrich machine). 1889, The Electrician 23:548 (a short account of a surviving Woolrich machine constructed in 1844 and its subsequent history).S.Timmins, 1866, Birmingham and the Midland Hardware District, London, pp. 488– 94.GW -
20 autonomation
Opsa production system in which workers are allowed, and machines are equipped with a mechanism, to stop production if a defect in a product is detected during the production process. Autonomation became known through the Toyota production system. The concept evolved from braking devices on machines that automatically stop if a problem occurs. Within Toyota, the concept has been carried forward so that all machines are equipped with various safety devices to prevent defective products, and production workers are allowed to stop the production line if a problem occurs. The problem is then properly explored in order to find a solution and to ensure that everyone understands the underlying reasons for the problem. In the long term, this creates a more efficient production line.
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